Marine LNG Bunkering Manifold, ESD-1 / ESD-2 Ship-Shore Link (SSL), Emergency Release Coupling (ERC) & Pre-Transfer Purging Guide

Marine LNG bunkering manifold, SSL ESD-1/ESD-2 and ERC fault symptoms, root causes and immediate verification actions

1. Bunkering Station Arrangement, Manifold Dry-Disconnect & MSC.551(108) ERC Architecture

Under Chapter 8 of the International Code of Safety for Ships Using Gases or Other Low-Flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code, IMO Res. MSC.391(95) as amended) and ISO 20519:2021 (Specification for bunkering of liquefied natural gas fuelled vessels), the shipboard bunkering station forms the primary physical containment and isolation boundary between the bunker supplier and the vessel fuel storage system. IGF Code 8.3.1.1 requires the bunkering station to be positioned on open deck with sufficient natural ventilation, while closed or semi-enclosed bunkering stations undergo special risk-assessment consideration (4.2.2) and require dedicated ventilation under 13.7 to discharge any released vapour safely outside. Where fuel piping runs inside ducts or double-wall pipes, IGF Code 13.8.1 requires extraction ventilation of at least 30 air changes per hour (13.8.4 allows a lower rate only if a flow velocity of at least 3 m/s is ensured with the fuel pipes and components installed), with the inlet taken from a non-hazardous area and protected by a wire mesh guard against water ingress (13.8.3). For ships constructed on or after 1 January 2024, IMO Res. MSC.458(101) replaced the double-wall rules with 9.5.3 to 9.5.6: gaseous fuel pipes in ventilated ducts (9.5.4), and liquefied fuel pipes in a secondary enclosure able to contain leakage (9.5.6).

Cryogenic spill management and hull steel protection are engineered around the physical behaviour of LNG, which boils at roughly -162 deg C at atmospheric pressure and rapidly embrittles ordinary carbon-manganese deck and side-shell plating on contact. Under IGF Code 8.3.1.2 to 8.3.1.5, manifold piping must be arranged so external mechanical damage cannot breach the ship fuel containment system, arrangements must be provided for safe management of any spilled fuel (8.3.1.3, typically stainless-steel drip trays and drains), and surrounding hull or deck structures must be protected against unacceptable cooling (typically through a continuously running hull water curtain during transfer alongside low-temperature drip-tray monitoring specified in the approved Fuel Handling Manual). In parallel, 11.5.1 to 11.5.3 and 11.5.7 require a fixed water-spray fire-protection system covering exposed open-deck storage tanks and adjacent bunkering station boundaries (at 10 litres/min/m2 for horizontal projected surfaces and 4 litres/min/m2 for vertical surfaces) with remote pump start and valve actuation accessible outside the fire-exposed zone and operable from the remote bunkering control location (15.5.1).

Amended manifold connection rules entered into force on 1 January 2026 under IMO Resolution MSC.551(108), which replaced IGF Code 8.4.1 and added 8.4.2 and 8.4.3. Under revised 8.4.1, the bunkering manifold must be designed to withstand the external loads during bunkering and achieve a dry-disconnect operation through one of three recognised configurations: a dry-disconnect/connect coupling (DDC) to a standard at least equivalent to those acceptable to the IMO (8.4.1.1; industry commonly refers to ISO 21593:2019), a manual or hydraulic connect coupler mated to the presentation flange (8.4.1.2), or a bolted flange-to-flange assembly (8.4.1.3). Under 8.4.2, whenever a ship uses a manual/hydraulic coupler (8.4.1.2) or bolted flange assembly (8.4.1.3) rather than an integral DDC, the hardware must be combined with strict draining and purging procedures that achieve dry-disconnect performance, backed by a design-stage risk assessment (4.2.2) evaluating dynamic manifold loads and documented in the approved Fuel Handling Manual (18.2.3).

To protect against vessel surge, mooring line failure or tug/bunker barge drift-off, IGF Code 8.4.3 (MSC.551(108)) requires an Emergency Release Coupling (ERC) or Emergency Release System (ERS), or equivalent means, enabling a rapid physical dry break-away disconnection in an emergency, unless that ERC/ERS is installed on the bunkering supply side of the transfer line. In typical designs, the ERC sits in series with the transfer hose or loading arm and incorporates opposing self-sealing check poppets or synchronised double ball valves that close both upstream and downstream bores before the shear-pin or hydraulic/pneumatic collar separates. Immediately inboard of the presentation flange, IGF Code 8.5.3 mandates a manually operated stop valve and a remotely operated shutdown valve in series (or a combined manual and remote valve) in every liquid and vapour bunkering line, while 8.3.2.2 requires any ship fuel hoses subjected to tank, pump or compressor discharge pressure to have a bursting pressure of at least five times the maximum bunkering pressure, and 8.5.6 requires positive cross-over isolation so fuel cannot pass inadvertently to the unused side of the ship.

• Verify spill-management arrangements such as drip trays, hull-protection water curtains (IGF Code 8.3.1.3 and 8.3.1.5) and, where fuel tanks are on open deck, remote actuation of the fixed 10 and 4 litres/min/m2 water-spray system (11.5.1 to 11.5.3, 11.5.7 and 15.5.1) before hose or arm connection.
• Inspect bunker transfer hoses and saddles against IGF Code 8.3.2.2 (bursting pressure at least five times maximum bunkering pressure), checking pressure-test certificates, cryogenic flexibility, and proper mechanical support to prevent flange over-stressing.
• Confirm the manifold dry-disconnect configuration (IGF Code 8.4.1.1 DDC or 8.4.1.2/8.4.1.3 coupler/bolted flange per the Fuel Handling Manual risk assessment) and verify that a live, unpinned ERC/ERS dry break-away unit (8.4.3) is fitted on either the manifold or supplier line.
• Verify electrical continuity and insulating-flange integrity on supplier hoses or arms (IGF Code 18.4.5 and ISO 20519:2021) without bridging insulating flanges with external bonding cables, and confirm unused cross-over valves are locked shut (8.5.6).

2. ESD-1 / ESD-2 Ship-Shore Link (SSL), 30-Second Liquid-Line ESD Closure & Surge Control

Automated emergency shutdown coordination between the receiving vessel and the LNG bunker supplier relies on the Ship-Shore Link (SSL). Under IGF Code 8.5.7 and 18.4.4.4, every gas-fuelled ship must carry an SSL or equivalent means for automatic and manual ESD communication that is fully compatible with the delivering facility ESD system. When bunkering ship-to-ship from an LNG bunker vessel certified as a gas carrier under the IGC Code (IMO Res. MSC.370(93)), IGC Code 18.10.1.4 likewise requires the bunker vessel cargo ESD system to incorporate an SSL. Depending on system design under ISO 20519:2021 and SIGTTO and SGMF industry guidance (ISO 28460:2010 covers the equivalent ship-shore interface for LNG carriers at terminals), the SSL transmits bidirectional trip signals over intrinsically safe electric multipin cables, fibre-optic connectors, pneumatic links or approved wireless/umbilical telemetry. Under IGF Code 18.4.4.1, direct voice and SSL communications between the receiving ship Person in Charge (PIC) and bunkering source PIC must be maintained continuously: if communication is lost at any point, bunkering must stop immediately and not resume until restored.

In common LNG bunkering practice, reflected in the ship Fuel Handling Manual (IGF Code 18.4.2.1.8), emergency protection is structured into two progressive stages so routine process trips never cause mechanical break-away spills. ESD-1 is the primary process and manual emergency shutdown stage: activated by manual ESD pushbuttons, tank overfill sensors (15.4.2.2), fixed gas detection reaching 40% LEL on two detectors (15.8.6, or 60% LEL in machinery-space ventilated ducts under 15.8.7 and Chapter 15, Table 1, plus bunkering-duct gas detection under 15.5.3), fire detection, loss of SSL signal, or stage-1 vessel drift-off warning, ESD-1 trips the supplier transfer pumps/compressors and closes both ship and supplier remote ESD valves cleanly while leaving the hose or arm coupled. ESD-2 is the secondary emergency release stage triggered if the vessel continues drifting toward the outer mechanical envelope of the transfer hose or loading arm: ESD-2 commands isolation valve closure and fires the ERC/ERS release collar (8.4.3) so physical dry break-away occurs before tensile overload can fracture either manifold.

Chief Engineers and Electrical/ETO officers must distinguish carefully between statutory valve-closure rules during pre-bunkering timing tests. Under IGF Code 16.7.3.6 (receiving vessel: ESD valves in liquefied gas piping systems) and IGC Code 18.10.2.1.3 (gas-carrier LNG bunker vessels: ESD valves in liquid piping systems), these valves must close fully and smoothly within 30 seconds of actuation, and verifiable, repeatable information on valve closure times and operating characteristics must be kept available on board. On IGC Code bunker vessels the 30-second rule is worded for liquid lines, while the IGF wording for the receiving ship does not expressly exclude vapour lines, so use the closure times in the ship's approved documentation; on IGC Code bunker vessels, deck fire-initiated ESD uses fusible plugs, electronic point temperature monitoring or area fire detection in accordance with IGC Code Table 18.1.

Separate from the 30-second ESD valve closure limit, IGF Code 8.5.8, 15.4.2.2 and 16.7.3.7 govern the high-high overfill protection valve on the receiving ship. Each LNG fuel tank requires a high liquid level alarm (15.4.2.1) and an independent overfill sensor (15.4.2.2) that automatically actuates the remote bunkering shutoff valve to prevent the tank becoming liquid full while avoiding excessive liquid surge pressure in the transfer line. Under 16.7.3.7 (cross-referenced by 8.5.8), unless demonstrated to require a higher value due to pressure-surge calculations, total closing time from shutdown signal initiation to complete valve closure must not exceed 3600 * U / BR seconds (where U is ullage volume in m3 at the operating signal level and BR is the agreed maximum bunkering rate in m3/h) or 5 seconds, whichever is least. Because rapid closure against high-velocity LNG creates destructive hydraulic surge (Joukowsky water-hammer spikes) across hoses, ERC poppets and manifold welds, 16.7.3.7 explicitly requires adjusting the agreed maximum bunkering rate BR so that valve-closure surge pressure is limited to an acceptable level.

• Conduct warm/dry SSL functional trip tests (IGF Code 18.4.3.1.1 and 18.4.4.4) in both ship-to-supplier and supplier-to-ship directions prior to line cool-down, recording pass timestamps in the mutually signed bunker safety checklist.
• Measure and log full-open to full-closed travel times of the ESD valves covered by the 30-second limit (IGF Code 16.7.3.6 liquefied gas piping; IGC Code 18.10.2.1.3 liquid piping) as listed in the ship's approved documentation, confirming smooth seat approach and verifying onboard closure-curve records.
• Verify the agreed maximum bunkering rate BR against tank overfill sensor ullage U and remote valve stroke time under IGF Code 16.7.3.7 (3600 * U / BR seconds or 5 seconds, whichever is least) so surge pressure stays within hose and piping limits.
• Function-test tank high-level and independent overfill alarms prior to transfer (IGF Code 15.4.2.4 and 18.4.3), confirm any overflow-control override is locked against inadvertent operation with continuous bridge/control-station visual indication (15.4.2.5), and test bunker-duct fan-loss (15.5.2) and gas-detection ESD trips (15.5.3).

3. Pre-Transfer Nitrogen Inerting, Line Cool-Down, 6.8 Loading Limits & Post-Bunkering Purging

Every LNG bunkering operation starts with formal written alignment between the receiving ship PIC and the bunkering source PIC under IGF Code 18.4.1. Under 18.4.1.1.1 as amended by IMO Res. MSC.551(108) (in force 1 January 2026), both PICs must agree in writing before transfer commences on the complete transfer procedure (including cooling down and, if necessary, gassing up), the maximum transfer rate at all stages, the minimum and maximum limiting transfer pressure and temperature, the bunkering-line pressure relief valve (PRV) settings, and the volume to be transferred, alongside written emergency procedures (18.4.1.1.2) and a completed, mutually signed bunker safety checklist (18.4.1.1.3 and 18.4.3.2). Permanently mounted fuel system schematics/P&IDs must be displayed at both the bunker station and the remote bunker control station (18.4.2.2), where tank pressure, tank temperature, tank level, remote manifold/water-spray valves and overfill shutdown status are continuously monitored (15.5.1).

Pre-transfer nitrogen inerting, moisture purging and controlled cool-down protect the manifold from explosion hazards, ice seizure and flange thermal shock. Under IGF Code 8.5.1, 8.5.2 and 18.6.1 to 18.6.2, inerting and purging prevent any combustible gas-air atmosphere from forming inside piping or tanks, prevent air from entering gas-filled piping, and prohibit gas discharge to the atmosphere during storage-tank filling. Never apply guessed universal bar or dewpoint figures across different vessels: sweep or pressure-cycle the coupled hose/arm and manifold spool with dry nitrogen strictly to the oxygen, moisture-dewpoint and leak-test hold pressures specified in the ship approved Fuel Handling Manual (18.2.3) and ISO 20519:2021 interface procedure, ensuring residual humidity cannot freeze ERC poppets or ESD seats when cryogenic flow begins. Once tightness is proven, admit cold natural gas vapour or misted LNG slowly to chill the transfer line within the Fuel Handling Manual cool-down rate limit so differential contraction cannot bow stainless piping or relax presentation-flange gasket stress.

Bulk loading and topping-off must strictly obey the storage-tank filling rules in IGF Code 6.8 and boil-off gas (BOG) pressure-holding rules in 6.9. Under IGF Code 6.8.1, liquefied gas storage tanks must not be filled beyond a volume equivalent to 98% full at the reference temperature (defined in 2.2.36 as the temperature corresponding to the saturated vapour pressure of the fuel at the PRV set pressure), governed by the loading-limit curve LL = FL * (rho_R / rho_L) where FL equals 98%, rho_R is fuel relative density at reference temperature, and rho_L is fuel relative density at loading temperature. Engineers should note the exact scope of IGF Code 6.8.2 and 6.8.3 (where 6.8.3 was added by IMO Res. MSC.458(101) for ships constructed on or after 1 January 2024): a higher loading limit than calculated using the reference temperature (but never above 95%) is a special Administration/Class exception rather than a standard filling limit, permitted under 6.8.2 (the original text, which carries no construction-date limit) only where tank insulation and location make the probability of external-fire tank heating very small or a secondary 6.9 pressure-maintenance system independent of fuel consumers is fitted, and permitted under 6.8.3 (for ships constructed on or after 1 January 2024) strictly where tank insulation and location make the probability of external-fire tank heating very small. Throughout loading, tank pressure must be controlled via top spray, vapour return to the supplier, reliquefaction or approved gas consumers without venting to atmosphere (6.9.1.2 and 8.5.2, alongside the 6.9.1.1 15-day idle pressure-hold capability), while balancing top versus bottom fill lines according to heel versus delivered LNG density to avoid tank stratification and rollover (the Fuel Handling Manual describes the emergency actions, 18.4.2.1.9).

Post-transfer stripping, gas-freeing and fuel quality documentation are equally critical before uncoupling. After stepping down flow rate to complete the agreed volume, crews drain all liquid LNG from pump suctions, hoses and ship bunkering pipes into the storage tank or approved receiver (IGF Code 8.3.1.4 and 8.5.4), warm and sweep hydrocarbons using dry nitrogen, and comply with 8.5.5, which requires bunkering pipes to be inerted and gas-freed, remaining free of gas whenever not engaged in bunkering unless the consequences of not gas-freeing have been formally evaluated and approved. Only after manifold gauges and calibrated portable gas checks confirm liquid-free, depressurised and Fuel Handling Manual purge completion is the coupling disconnected and blanked. Finally, under 18.4.1.2 and the Annex to Part C-1, both PICs sign the LNG Bunker Delivery Note (LNG-BDN) recording methane number (MN), lower and higher calorific values (MJ/kg), Wobbe indices, density (kg/m3), delivered and tank LNG temperatures and pressures, hydrocarbon/nitrogen/sulphur mass percentages plus trace contaminant limits on the Part C-1 Annex form, and net delivered totals (t, MJ, m3 and GJ) so engine-room staff can update dual-fuel or spark-gas knock-control methane number inputs.

• Execute and sign the MSC.551(108) written pre-bunkering PIC agreement (IGF Code 18.4.1.1.1) specifying cool-down/gassing-up steps, stage rates, minimum/maximum transfer pressures and temperatures, bunkering-line PRV settings, and emergency actions.
• Purge coupled transfer lines with dry nitrogen to the exact oxygen, dewpoint and leak-test criteria in the approved Fuel Handling Manual (18.2.3 and 18.6.2), and adhere strictly to the manual cool-down rate before bulk LNG transfer.
• Verify maximum target filling volume against the approved tank loading-limit curve (IGF Code 6.8.1 98% at reference temperature, or Class-approved 6.8.2/6.8.3 special curve where applicable), route top/bottom fill to avoid stratification and rollover (emergency actions described in the Fuel Handling Manual, 18.4.2.1.9), and maintain zero atmospheric venting (8.5.2).
• Drain all residual liquid LNG (8.5.4), nitrogen-purge and gas-free ship bunkering lines upon completion unless specifically approved otherwise (8.5.5), and verify the signed Part C-1 Annex LNG-BDN (18.4.1.2) including methane number before updating engine control parameters.

4. STCW Reg. V/3 Competence, ISM Code 10.3 Critical Checks & MSC.581(110) Space Entry Precautions

Statutory crew qualification on gas-fuelled ships is governed by IGF Code Chapter 19 (19.2), STCW Regulation V/3 (IMO Res. MSC.396(95)), STCW Code Section A-V/3 (IMO Res. MSC.397(95)), with ISO 20519:2021 also addressing the training and qualification of bunkering personnel. All seafarers must receive ship-specific IGF familiarisation before being assigned shipboard duties (STCW Reg. V/3.3 and I/14.1.5). Crew members with designated safety duties associated with the care, use of, or emergency response to gas fuel must hold a Certificate of Proficiency (CoP) in Basic Training for Service on Ships Subject to the IGF Code (V/3.4, with Basic or Advanced Liquefied Gas Tanker V/1-2 certification accepted under V/3.6). Masters, engineer officers, and all personnel with immediate responsibility for the care and use of fuels and fuel systems, typically including the ship Bunkering PIC, must hold an Advanced IGF Code CoP (V/3.7 and V/3.8, requiring Basic IGF CoP, an approved advanced course, and at least 1 month of approved seagoing service with at least 3 bunkering operations on IGF ships, up to 2 replaceable by approved simulator training, or the V/3.9 route for officers already certified for advanced liquefied gas tanker service, who also meet V/3.6, have completed the bunkering operations or 3 cargo operations, and have 3 months' relevant seagoing service in the previous 5 years), maintained via 5-yearly refresher evidence (V/3.12). Missing or expired STCW Reg. V/3 Certificates of Proficiency are among the deficiencies that may warrant detention under IMO Res. A.1206(34) Appendix 2 (STCW Reg. I/4.2.1), at the Port State Control officer's professional judgement.

Under ISM Code Section 10.3 (IMO Res. A.741(18)), the Company should consider identifying, in the Safety Management System, SSL transceivers, ESD-1/ESD-2 trip loops, 30-second ESD valve actuators (IGF Code 16.7.3.6), ERC break-away assemblies (8.4.3), tank high-level and 16.7.3.7 overfill sensors (including physical fuel-level raising tests at the first full loading after delivery and after every dry-docking under 15.4.2.3), fixed/portable gas detectors, and bunker-duct extraction fans as critical systems whose sudden operational failure may create hazardous situations, backing them with scheduled PMS functional tests. Regular gas-related emergency exercises and tabletop drills under IGF Code Chapter 17 verify crew readiness against the Fuel Handling Manual (18.2.3). Throughout transfer, IGF Code 18.4.6.1 and 18.4.6.2 require fire-safety warning signs at bunkering access points, essential-personnel-only manifold access, appropriate personal protective equipment (18.4.6.2; in practice a face shield, insulated cryogenic gloves, splash-resistant long coveralls and antistatic safety footwear), and immediate transfer stoppage if any required safety condition fails, noting also under 18.4.6.3 and 18.4.6.4 that where portable LNG fuel tanks are used, connecting or disconnecting tank systems during a sea voyage or manoeuvring is strictly prohibited.

Inspection or maintenance inside a Tank Connection Space (TCS), fuel storage hold space, interbarrier space, Fuel Preparation Room, double-wall pipe duct or semi-enclosed bunker station carries severe asphyxiation and flammable-gas risk addressed by IGF Code 18.5.1, SOLAS Regulation XI-1/7, SOLAS Regulation III/19.3.3 (two-monthly enclosed-space entry and rescue drills) and IMO Resolution MSC.581(110) (adopted June 2025, Revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces Aboard Ships). Because nitrogen used for line purging (8.5.1 and 8.5.5) displaces oxygen without odour or visible mist and cold methane vapour initially pools in low pockets before warming and rising, crews should lock out all LNG and nitrogen valves, run continuous mechanical ventilation, stop ventilation before testing, and sample at multiple heights using the portable gas detector SOLAS Reg. XI-1/7 requires on board (measuring at least oxygen, flammable gases/vapours, H2S and CO, together with suitable onboard means for its calibration) to verify the recommended 20.9% oxygen by volume, below 1% LFL flammable vapour, below 0.5% carbon dioxide, and toxic contaminants below 50% of the occupational exposure limit under an entry permit whose maximum validity is 8 hours by default and which becomes void if the space is left unattended, remembering that EEBDs are strictly for escape and never for entry.

Class surveyors, Flag State auditors, Port State Control officers (IMO Res. A.1206(34)) and commercial SIRE 2.0 or RightShip RISQ 3.2 vetting inspectors routinely audit SSL pre-transfer checklists (IGF Code 18.4.3), 30-second ESD valve stroke records (16.7.3.6 and IGC Code 18.10.2.1.3), post-dry-dock high-level float/sensor test certificates (15.4.2.3), signed LNG-BDN files (18.4.1.2) and STCW Reg. V/3 CoP matrices. Aligning bunkering watchstanding directly with the vessel approved Fuel Handling Manual (18.2.3), permanently mounted bunker-station P&IDs (18.4.2.2) and ISM Code Section 10.3 test logs prevents costly bunker delays and nuisance ESD-1 trips during tight port calls. For ship-specific LNG bunkering procedure reviews, SSL/ESD fault diagnostics or pre-vetting readiness support, Marvel Solutionz offers remote technical support at $350 USD for a 1-hour consultancy (+ 5% sales tax) alongside practical crew training in the LNG, Dual-Fuel (DF) & Spark-Gas (SG) Academy at $395 USD self-paced (+ 5% sales tax), with Lab 01 as a free 5-minute interactive trial and Labs 02 to 05 in the paid programme, or $3,500 USD (+ 5% sales tax) for Corporate Team Training up to 10 engineers.

• Verify valid STCW Reg. V/3 Basic (V/3.4) and Advanced (V/3.7 to V/3.9) Certificates of Proficiency, 5-yearly refresher evidence (V/3.12), and ship-specific familiarisation logs (V/3.3) for all officers and ratings assigned to LNG bunkering duties.
• Track SSL loop checks, 30-second ESD valve stroke tests (16.7.3.6), ERC inspections (8.4.3), and post-dry-dock full-loading high-level alarm tests (15.4.2.3) under ISM Code Section 10.3 critical-equipment PMS routines alongside Chapter 17 gas drills.
• Enforce access warning signs, essential-staff limits and cryogenic PPE at the manifold (IGF Code 18.4.6.1 and 18.4.6.2), prohibit connecting or disconnecting portable fuel tanks at sea or during manoeuvring (18.4.6.4), and halt transfer immediately upon any safety or communication lapse (18.4.4.1).
• Lock out nitrogen and LNG lines, verify the portable gas detector SOLAS XI-1/7 requires on board together with its onboard calibration means, conduct two-monthly SOLAS III/19.3.3 rescue drills, and follow IMO Res. MSC.581(110) multi-level testing recommendations (20.9% O2 and below 1% LFL) under an entry permit valid for 8 hours at most by default (void if the space is left unattended) before entering any TCS, hold space or semi-enclosed bunker station.

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Marvel Solutionz & SeaReady Resources

Regulatory & Technical Sources

• IMO Resolution MSC.391(95) - International Code of Safety for Ships Using Gases or Other Low-Flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code)
• IMO Resolution MSC.551(108) - Amendments to the IGF Code (Bunkering Manifolds, ERC and Pre-Bunkering PIC Agreements, in force 1 January 2026)
• IMO Resolution MSC.458(101) - Amendments to the IGF Code (Tank Loading Limit Regulation 6.8.3 and Fuel Piping Regulations 9.5.3 to 9.5.6)
• IMO Resolution MSC.370(93) - Revised International Gas Carrier (IGC) Code (Regulations 18.10.1.4 SSL and 18.10.2.1.3 Liquid ESD Closure)
• ISO 20519:2021 - Ships and Marine Technology - Specification for Bunkering of Liquefied Natural Gas Fuelled Vessels
• IMO Resolution MSC.396(95) - STCW Convention Regulation V/3 Mandatory Minimum Requirements for Training and Qualifications on Ships Subject to the IGF Code
• IMO Resolution MSC.397(95) - STCW Code Section A-V/3 Basic and Advanced IGF Code Competence Tables
• IMO Resolution MSC.581(110) - Revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces Aboard Ships
• IMO Resolution A.741(18) - International Safety Management (ISM) Code (Section 10.3 Critical Equipment and Technical Systems)
• SGMF - Society for Gas as a Marine Fuel Industry LNG Bunkering Guidance